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I. INTRODUCTION
A critical question now before the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Hoskins2 concerns the scope of the word “agent” as used 
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).3  In a prior 
1. The authors are members of the White Collar, Regulatory Defense &
Investigations Practice Group in the Washington, D.C. office of Winston & 
Strawn LLP. 
2. Brief for the United States of America, United States v. Hoskins, No.
20-842(L) (2d Cir. July 13, 2020) [hereinafter “DOJ Br.”].
3. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING 
1
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appeal involving the same case (“Hoskins I”),4 the Second Circuit 
held that the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) could 
not prosecute foreign national Lawrence Hoskins under the 
FCPA for conduct committed abroad on a conspiracy or aiding-
and-abetting theory.5  The court found that Congress was 
concerned with the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA and 
endeavored to limit its application by carefully delineating the 
categories of included foreign nationals and conduct.6  It held 
that Hoskins could not be prosecuted under the FCPA unless he 
fell within one of those enumerated categories, which includes 
officers, directors, employees, and agents of a company with a 
sufficient U.S. nexus to be subject to the FCPA,7 and that the 
 
CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 1:3 (2020) 
(“The case is significant because it narrows the jurisdictional reach of DOJ over 
nonresident foreign nationals, directly contradicting existing DOJ guidance.”). 
4. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018). 
5. Id. at 97; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 36 (2019) 
[hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE] (citing United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 
872, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2019) as support for their position post-Hoskins I).  DOJ and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disagree with the holding in 
Hoskins I and maintain that conspiracy and aiding and abetting theories can 
be used to prosecute those who do not fall into any of the FCPA’s enumerated 
categories of liable persons, but they acknowledge that the decision is binding 
in the Second Circuit. 
6. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 94. 
7. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 77dd-2(a).  The FCPA applies to an 
“issuer” that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78 or that 
is required to file reports under section 78o(d) of Title 15 and to a “domestic 
concern,” along with any officer, director, or employee acting on its behalf to 
commit a prohibited foreign bribery offense.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  “Issuer” is 
statutorily defined to mean “any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security; except that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities, voting-
trust certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates 
of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board 
of directors or of the fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the term 
‘issuer’ means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the 
duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other 
agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued; and except 
that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term 
‘issuer’ means the person by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, 
used.”  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).  Thus, foreign companies that are publicly traded 
on a U.S. stock exchange will be issuers.  “Domestic concern” is statutorily 
defined to mean “(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of 
the United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-
stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole 
proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, 
or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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government could not use conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting 
liability theories to expand those categories. 
Hoskins was employed by a U.K. subsidiary of the French 
power company, Alstom S.A. (“Alstom”) and seconded to another 
subsidiary based in France, Alstom Resources Management.8  
While the FCPA did not reach the foreign subsidiaries, the 
Second Circuit remanded the case, at the government’s urging, 
so the prosecution could seek to prove that Hoskins was guilty 
as an “agent” of Alstom’s U.S. subsidiary, Alstom Power Inc. 
(“API”).9  On remand, the jury agreed with the government and 
convicted Hoskins for violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions.10  Nevertheless, the district court set aside the 
conviction, finding that the record failed to establish that API 
had sufficient control over Hoskins to establish an agency 
relationship.11  The government appealed (“Hoskins II”), arguing 
that the district court erred by construing the term “agent” too 
narrowly.12 
Although the district court reached the right result, we 
believe the issue was framed improperly.  Words are not to be 
construed “in a vacuum.”13  Rather, there “is a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must 
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.”14  And when an undefined word in a 
statute is borrowed from another body of law, the word should 
be defined in accordance with that borrowed body of law.15  But 
before the district court, the word “agent” was not construed 
based on its context or its place in the statutory scheme.  
 
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”  15 U.S.C. § 
77dd-2(h)(1). 
8. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72. 
9. Id. 
10. United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12cr238, 2020 WL 914302, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 26, 2020). 
11. Id. at *13. 
12. See DOJ Br, supra note 2. 
13. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (quoting Davis 
v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 
14. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 666 (2007)). 
15. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 73 (2012) [hereinafter “READING LAW”] (noting 
this canon applies whether the term was borrowed from common law or a 
specific field of law). 
3
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Instead, without pointing to any evidence that Congress so 
intended, the parties agreed that the term should be interpreted 
to hold its common law meaning, and the district court construed 
the term accordingly.16 
The parties continue to litigate the scope of common law 
agency on the current appeal,17  but the FCPA uses the term 
“agent” in a much narrower sense than it was used before the 
district court.  In settling on the common law definition, the 
parties and the district court looked to the wrong body of law.  
The term “agent” is a term of art in the field of anti-corruption 
law, and the district court should have defined the term 
accordingly.18 
 
16. Hoskins initially argued in a motion in limine that the term “agent” 
in the FCPA refers to a specific type of special agent—a foreign third-party 
intermediary engaged by a domestic concern to pay a bribe on its behalf.  
Memorandum of Law at 2, United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12-cr-238, 2019 WL 
1213028 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2020).  He was right, and this is directly supported 
by the legislative history as explained below, but the district court never 
decided this issue because the parties ultimately agreed to stipulate for the 
purposes of trial to define “agent” in accordance with the common law.  United 
States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12cr238, 2020 WL 914302, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 
2020).  Hoskins renewed this argument on appeal in a footnote in his brief.  
Brief for Hoskins at 15 n.7, United States v. Hoskins, No. 20-842(L) (2d Cir. 
Oct. 23, 2020) [hereinafter “Hoskins Br.”].  “Here, both parties agreed that the 
common-law definition of agency applied.  However, there is strong reason to 
conclude that Congress actually intended ‘agents’ in the context of the FCPA 
to refer to a narrower category of individuals.  Indeed, as Mr. Hoskins 
explained in a motion in limine, the legislative history of the FCPA strongly 
suggests that Congress was concerned with third-party, bribe-paying 
intermediaries—not any person who might qualify as an agent under common-
law agency principles—when it added the term ‘agent’ to the FCPA.”  Id.  
Although we advocate for the narrower definition of “agent” that Hoskins 
initially argued, Hoskins agreement to define “agent” in accordance with the 
common law shifted the battle to ground that he could, and before the district 
court did, prevail upon.  That definition may be good enough to protect 
Hoskins, but the Second Circuit should define the term as Congress intended, 
which would protect a wider class of persons. 
17. On appeal, the parties both seem to view “agent” as having a singular 
meaning at common law, but they disagree as to the controlling definition.  The 
prosecution claims that the district court’s analysis, defended by Hoskins on 
appeal, “misunderstands . . . common law principles of agency.”  DOJ Br., supra 
note 2, at 60.  By contrast, Hoskins tells the Second Circuit that “the 
government has advanced an ever-expanding agency definition, one that would 
make ‘agent’ a synonym for ‘conspirator,’ thereby resuscitating the erroneous 
interpretation of the FCPA that this Court’s prior decision properly foreclosed.”  
Hoskins Br., supra note 16, at 5. 
18. The International Academy of Financial Crimes Litigators (“IAFCL”) 
filed an amicus brief that argues Congress did not look to the common law in 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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When the initial FCPA passed in 1977, Congress 
contemplated a specific problem related to agents.  The concern 
was that U.S. companies were hiring people in foreign countries 
as “agents” who ostensibly were retained for legitimate reasons, 
but who were used to pass bribes on to foreign government 
officials.19  Typically, companies would pay these agents 
disproportionate sums of money for whatever legitimate work 
they did, if any, with full knowledge that some of this money 
would be used by the agent to pay bribes.20  For a variety of 
reasons though, including a desire to avoid intruding on the 
foreign sovereignty of other nations, the 1977 FCPA “did allow 
liability for agents, but restricted the liability to an agent who 
was ‘a United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,’ and also 
 
defining “agent,” but that Congress instead looked to a settled understanding 
of what the word “agent” meant in anti-corruption circles.  Brief for the 
International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Defendant-Appellee and Affirmance, United States v. Hoskins, 20-
842(L) (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter “IAFCL Br.”].   The IAFCL noted 
that the concern was with U.S. companies paying bribes through foreign 
procurement consultants, often explicitly called “agents,” who often were paid 
excessive fees on the understanding that part of the money they received would 
be passed along as bribes.  Id. at 6.  We agree that this was Congress’ focus, 
and our definition of “agent” as a special agent retained for the purpose of 
paying foreign government officials bribes essentially overlaps with IAFCL’s 
understanding of that term.  The National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (“NACDL”) also filed an amicus brief in the case advocating the same 
definition of “agent” that we support.  Brief of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 3, 
United States v. Hoskins, No. 20-842(L) (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter 
“NACDL Br.”].  “[T]he text, structure, and legislative history of the FCPA 
demonstrate that Congress intended the term ‘agent’ to have a narrower 
meaning than the common-law definition: specifically, Congress intended that 
‘agent’ liability be restricted to foreign bribe-paying intermediaries.”  Id.; see 
also Christian R. Martinez, Note, The Curious Case of Lawrence Hoskins: 
Evaluating the Scope of Agency Under the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA, 
53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 211, 239 (2020) (advocating a similar 
interpretation of “agent”).  Because Congress used the term “agent” as a term 
of art based on its usage in the field of anti-corruption law, that interpretation 
is controlling.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 487–88 
(2005) (although “seaman” is undefined in the statute it is a “term of art” in 
maritime law and “Congress took the term ‘seaman’ as the general maritime 
law found it”); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974) 
(rejecting ordinary definition of “working conditions” in a statute because “the 
term has a different and much more specific meaning in the language of 
industrial relations”). 
19. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
20. See id. 
5
204 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 41.2 
required a finding that the employer had been liable.”21  And 
Congress focused on this same concern when it amended the 
FCPA in 1988 to extend civil liability to foreign “agents.”22 
This is the very same problem related to agents that led to 
Congress expanding criminal penalties under the FCPA to 
“agents” regardless of their nationality in 1998.  The initial 
FCPA failed to redress the global corruption problem, in large 
part because the United States often found itself fighting the 
battle alone.23  Ultimately, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) promulgated the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (“OECD Bribery 
Convention” or “OECD Convention”), which was signed by the 
United States and dozens of countries.24  The OECD Convention 
required signatories to adopt anti-bribery provisions that would, 
among other things, address the specific problem of enlisting 
foreign agents to pay bribes.25  As the DOJ and the SEC explain: 
“In 1998, the FCPA was amended to conform to the 
requirements of the Anti-Bribery Convention.”26  This use of the 
term “agent” was even adopted by the prosecution in Hoskins to 
describe the local agents who were retained to pay bribes.27 
“Agent,” therefore, was a term of art when Congress enacted 
the FCPA in 1977 and when it expanded criminal liability to 
reach foreign agents in 1998, and that is the construction it 
should receive.  That interpretation also is consistent with its 
use in statutory context.  The word “agent” does not appear in 
isolation.  The FCPA applies to certain entities and “any officer, 
director, employee, or agent of such” entities,28 and the noscitur 
a sociis canon directs that “agent” should be construed similarly 
 
21. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 89 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation 
omitted). 
22. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
23. See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 91. 
24. Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, S. Treaty Doc No. 105-43 (Dec. 17, 1997) [hereinafter “OECD 
Convention”]. 
25. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
26. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3. 
27. IACFL Br., supra note 18, at 17–18. 
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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to these other terms.29  Consistent with Hoskins I and Congress’ 
refusal to extend co-conspirator liability to every foreign party 
who aids and abets an FCPA violation, a narrow definition 
restricts liability to those who are acting as the U.S-regulated 
entity itself.  Companies, for example, can only act through their 
people—the officers, directors, employees, or agents.  There is no 
ambiguity about whether someone is an officer, director, or 
employee of a company because there will be a formal 
relationship between those people and the company.  There is a 
similar level of formality when an agent is retained for the 
specific purpose of paying a bribe.  When someone agrees to that 
role as an agent, he or she will know it, just as someone will 
know whether he or she has become an officer, director, or 
employee of a company. 
Employing a broader and more generic definition of “agent,” 
which depends on an analysis of a host of factors, is problematic 
for many reasons.  A broad definition of “agent” that reaches 
anyone working on behalf of another would swallow the meaning 
of the words that surround it—officer, director, and 
employee,30—which would violate the canon against construing 
one term in a statute so broadly as to render other parts 
surplusage.31  Such a broad and ambiguous test would also 
deprive persons (particularly foreigners less familiar with the 
American legal system) of fair notice of when their assistance 
crosses over into agency, which would offend the rule of lenity.  
Finally, a broad construction of “agent” could become a backdoor 
means for prosecutors to charge the sorts of people Hoskins I 
barred from being charged as conspirators and aiders-and-
abettors, which would resurrect the same risk of prosecutorial 
overreach in a way that offends the sovereignty of foreign 
nations.32 
 
     A.  Background on United States v. Hoskins 
 
          1. Hoskins I 
The Second Circuit’s ruling in Hoskins I came in the wake 
 
29. See, e.g., READING LAW, supra note 15, at 195–98. 
30. See NACDL Br., supra note 18, at 12–13. 
31. See, e.g., READING LAW, supra note 15, at 174–79. 
32. See Hoskins Br., supra note 16, at 35 n.17. 
7
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of French power company Alstom S.A. pleading guilty to two 
FCPA counts in 2014 and paying a $772 million criminal penalty 
for bribing Indonesian officials to obtain contracts related to the 
“Tarahan Project,” a $118 million initiative to build a coal-fired 
power plant.33  The prosecution brought FCPA charges against 
several Alstom executives and subsidiaries, including Hoskins, 
a senior executive of Alstom’s U.K. subsidiary, Alstom UK Ltd., 
who was seconded at the time to Alstom subsidiary Alstom 
Resources Management in France.  The prosecution charged 
Hoskins with helping Alstom’s Connecticut-based subsidiary 
API hire contractors to pay the bribes.34 
The prosecution alleged that while employed by Alstom UK 
Ltd., Hoskins was assigned to an Alstom division called Country 
Network (later renamed “International Network”) that 
supported Alstom subsidiaries’ efforts to secure contracts 
around the world.35  Hoskins was the Area Senior Vice President 
for the Asia, Asia-Pacific, and Eastern and Northern Europe 
regions.36  In this role, he was involved with securing the 
Tarahan Project, which was contracted through Indonesia’s 
state-owned electricity company, Perusahaan Listrik Negara 
(“PLN”).37  The prosecution charged Hoskins with aiding and 
abetting API in hiring consultants to funnel bribes to PLN and 
other Indonesian officials to secure the contracts for the Tarahan 
Project.38  Specifically, the prosecution accused Hoskins of 
obtaining information about the status of the project from 
Indonesian officials, coordinating and engaging in discussions 
with others at Alstom regarding the plan to hire consultants to 
pay bribes, participating in the negotiation and approval of the 
agreements with the consultants, and meeting with the 
consultants regarding the plan.39  The prosecution alleged that 
API then paid those consultants under the agreements and that 
a portion of those payments was funneled to Indonesian officials 
 
33. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay 




35. DOJ Br., supra note 2, at 11. 
36. Id. at 12. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 13. 
39. Id. at 14–20. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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in the form of bribes, although Hoskins himself was not alleged 
to have paid anything to the consultants or officials.40 
In relevant part, Hoskins was charged with six counts of 
violating the FCPA’s bribery provisions, which provide that it: 
 
shall be unlawful for any domestic concern41 . . . 
or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of 
such domestic concern . . . to make use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of 
value to [a foreign official].42 
 
Hoskins also was prosecuted on one count of conspiracy to 
violate this same provision.43  In bringing the substantive 
charges, the prosecution proceeded on both the theory that 
Hoskins was liable as an agent of domestic concern, API, and on 
an aiding-and-abetting theory.44 
The Hoskins I appeal focused on whether FCPA liability 
could attach based on conspiracy or aiding-and-abetting theories 
of liability to persons who are not among the FCPA’s 
enumerated categories of potentially liable persons.45  Hoskins 
moved to dismiss the conspiracy count, and the prosecution filed 
a related motion in limine seeking to preclude Hoskins from 
arguing that the prosecution could not prevail on conspiracy or 
aiding-and-abetting theories alone, but would have to prove that 
Hoskins fell within one of the three FCPA-specific categories of 
persons.46  The district court granted Hoskins’ motion and 
rejected the prosecution’s motion,47 and the Second Circuit 
 
40. Id. 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h) (2020); see also supra text accompanying note 7 
(defining “domestic concern”). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). 
43. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2018). 
44. United States v. Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d 316, 319 (D. Conn. 2015). 
45. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73. 
46. Id. at 73–74. 
47. Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327. 
9
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affirmed.48 
The Second Circuit explained: 
 
The FCPA establishes three clear categories of 
persons who are covered by its provisions: (1) 
Issuers of securities registered pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. § 78l or required to file reports under 
Section 78o(d), or any officer, director, employee, 
or agent of such issuer, or any stockholder acting 
on behalf of the issuer, using interstate commerce 
in connection with the payment of bribes, 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1; (2) American companies and 
American persons using interstate commerce in 
connection with the payment of bribes, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-2; and (3) foreign persons or businesses 
taking acts to further certain corrupt schemes, 
including ones causing the payment of bribes, 
while present in the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd–3.49 
 
Importantly, the Second Circuit looked to the structure, 
text, and legislative history of the FCPA and applied the 
presumption that a statute has no extraterritorial effect absent 
express congressional authorization50 to conclude that Congress 
sought to limit liability to the listed categories.51  As Judge 
Lynch’s concurring opinion explained, “[i]n adopting the FCPA, 
 
48. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 98. 
49. Id. at 71.  Alternatively, the Second Circuit explained: “these 
provisions provide jurisdiction over the following persons, in the following 
scenarios: (1) American citizens, nationals, and residents, regardless of 
whether they violate the FCPA domestically or abroad; (2) most American 
companies, regardless of whether they violate the FCPA domestically or 
abroad; (3) agents, employees, officers, directors, and shareholders of most 
American companies, when they act on the company’s behalf, regardless of 
whether they violate the FCPA domestically or abroad; (4) foreign persons 
(including foreign nationals and most foreign companies) not within any of the 
aforementioned categories who violate the FCPA while present in the United 
States.”  Id. at 85. 
50. There is a presumption against construing a statute to have 
extraterritorial effect absent a clear statement by Congress to the contrary, 
and any extraterritorial scope afforded to a statute will be construed narrowly.  
See, e.g., READING LAW, supra note 15, at 268–72. 
51. See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 83–84. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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Congress sought to criminalize wrongful conduct by Americans 
and those who in various ways work with Americans, while 
avoiding unnecessary imposition on the sovereignty of other 
countries whose traditions and laws may differ from our own.”52  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit ruled that the prosecution could 
not rely upon conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories to 
expand liability beyond the categories of liable persons 
delineated by Congress.53 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit agreed that that the 
prosecution could still seek to prove at trial that Hoskins was 
the agent of API and was therefore liable under Section 78dd-
2(a).54  On remand, the prosecution sought to do exactly that. 
 
          2. Prelude to Hoskins II 
On remand, the prosecution persuaded the jury that 
Hoskins was guilty as an agent, but the district court disagreed 
and issued an order of acquittal.55  The district court concluded 
that the jury could find that API controlled the process for the 
hiring of foreign consultants to pay bribes, and that API gave 
Hoskins instructions regarding the hiring of those consultants, 
which he followed.56  Nevertheless, the district court found that 
“the evidence adduced at trial cannot support the conclusion 
that Mr. Hoskins acted subject to API’s control such that Mr. 
Hoskins was an agent of API.”57 
The district court explained: 
 
Agency is a legal concept that depends on the 
 
52. Id. at 102 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
53. See id. at 96–97.  While the conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting 
statutes are generally applicable, there is an exception where the substantive 
statute at issue reflects a congressional intent to limit the categories of persons 
who may be charged.  See, e.g., Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 
(1932).  Prior to Hoskins, the Fifth Circuit applied the same principle to the 
FCPA in a different context, holding that Congress carefully precluded foreign 
officials who accepted bribes from FCPA liability, so the U.S. government 
cannot prosecute those foreign officials under the general conspiracy statute.  
See generally United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1991). 
54. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 97. 
55. United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12cr238, 2020 WL 914302 (D. Conn. 
Feb. 26, 2020). 
56. Id. at *6–7. 
57. Id. at *7. 
11
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existence of three elements: (1) the manifestation 
by the principal that the agent shall act for him; 
(2) the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and 
(3) the understanding of the parties that the 
principal is to be in control of the undertaking.”  
In other words, an agency relationship arises 
when “one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent 
to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall 
act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent 
or otherwise consents so to act.58 
 
The district court emphasized that “[a]n essential element of 
agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions.”59  
Additionally, the district court explained, “‘[a]gency requires 
more than mere authorization to assert a particular interest.’  
Agency is a ‘fiduciary relationship.’”60 
Applying these standards, the district court found that the 
facts at trial did not demonstrate control.  Rather, the facts 
merely demonstrated that API directed the standards for the 
hiring of consultants and Hoskins assisted, for example, by 
revising draft agreements per API’s direction.61  While Hoskins 
did assist API, the district court observed that API lacked 
traditional indicia of control, such as the ability to hire or fire 
Hoskins, reassign him, dictate what he did, or review his 
performance, and there was no evidence Hoskins agreed to be 
controlled by API.62 
On appeal, the government maintains that the district court 
“misapplied cases of this Court and the Supreme Court to 
suggest a narrower view of control than the law permits,” and 
that agency can be inferred from API giving instructions that 
Hoskins followed.63  The government claims that “the district 
 
58. Id. at *2 (quoting Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d 
Cir. 2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
59. Id. at *3 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 713 (2013); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
60. Id. at *3 (quoting Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 713; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM L. INST. 2005)). 
61. Id. at *8. 
62. Id. 
63. DOJ Br., supra note 2, at 24. 
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court dispensed with the fact-bound agency analysis required . . 
. and instead relied on a claimed lack of certain ‘typical’ indicia 
of control (like the right to hire or fire).”64  Not surprisingly, 
Hoskins defends the district court’s analysis as resting upon a 
straight-forward application of the law to the facts, and raises 
the alarm that the government’s amorphous and watered-down 
standard invites a jury to find a sort of agency that would not 
have been recognized at common law and that leaves the line 
separating the legal from the illegal too unclear for people to 
safely navigate.65 
 
II. AGENT IS A TERM OF ART UNDER THE FCPA THAT 
REFERS TO THOSE AGENTS RETAINED FOR THE 
SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF PAYING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS BRIBES 
 
     A. Congress Used “Agent” in a Very Specific Sense in the 
FCPA 
 
The IAFCL is undoubtedly correct that the word “agent” has 
“an everyday, common-sense meaning that is understood and 
widely shared by members of the international community.”66  
As the problem of international bribery was receiving greater 
scrutiny in the post-Watergate era, it quickly became apparent 
that U.S. companies often were not paying bribes to foreign 
officials directly.67  Rather, it is “well known in the world of 
international bribery” that 
 
the bribing company will often turn to local 
individuals, invariably called “agents,” 
“intermediaries,” or “consultants” to, in essence, 
“do the dirty work.”  Often such agents take the 
formal position of a “consultant,” whose “fees” can 
 
64. Id. at 24–25. 
65. Hoskins Br., supra note 16, at 5. 
66. IAFCL Br., supra note 18, at 2. 
67. See, e.g., Evan Forbes, Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Asserting U.S. Interest or Foreign Intrusion?, 93 S. CAL 
L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2020) (“The United States began to acknowledge the 
problem of foreign bribery after Watergate,” and noting this led to an 
investigation in which more than 400 companies disclosed paying more than 
$300 million in foreign bribes.). 
13
212 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 41.2 
be carried as such on the company’s books, but in 
fact are used as a conduit to pay a bribe.68 
 
Much of the initial focus of congressional hearings leading 
up to the FCPA was on military contractors that paid millions in 
fees to local agents with the understanding that much of that 
money would be passed along to foreign officials as bribes.69  
This was the context in which Congress first considered the 
“agent” problem leading up to the passage of the FCPA in 1977.70 
 
68. IAFCL Br., supra note 18, at 10. 
69. See, e.g., id. at 10; Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 934–36 (2012); Prohibiting Bribes to 
Foreign Officials: Hearing on S. 3133, S. 3379 and S. 3418 Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affs., 94th Cong. 7 (1976) (statement of Sen. Frank 
Church) [hereinafter “Senate Hearings”] (“What we are talking about is an 
arms industry campaign to flood the Middle East with weapons, in which a 
U.S. aircraft company paid over $100 million in agents’ fees in one country to 
sell an airplane which has no competitor.  A large part of that $100 million is 
known to have ended up in the Swiss bank accounts of high military and 
civilian defense officials of the purchasing country.”); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 27–28 
(Comm. Print 1976) (submitted to the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affs.) [hereinafter “SEC REPORT”] (“Commercial Agents and Consultants: The 
Commission recognizes that corporations doing business abroad often engage 
the services of non-official nationals possessing specialized information with 
regard to business opportunities or relationships which are of assistance in 
securing or maintaining business.”). 
70. See, e.g., NACDL Br., supra note 18, at 14–15; SEC REPORT, supra 
note 69, at 28 (“Commission or consultant payments substantially in excess of 
the going rate for [] services may give rise to a disclosable event, depending 
upon the significance of the business involved.  In many instances, this may 
suggest that a portion of the commission was, in fact, intended to be passed 
through to government officials or their designees to influence government 
action.”).  When the initial legislation was discussed at a Senate Banking 
Committee hearing in 1976, witnesses testified about the use of foreign third-
party intermediaries to pay bribes on behalf of American corporations.  
Leonard C. Meeker of the Center for Law and Social Policy testified that 
corporate funds were “transferred to foreign bank accounts or foreign 
subsidiaries, and a foreign employee or agent ha[d] drawn cash to pay bribes 
or kick-backs or to contribute to foreign political campaigns.”  Senate Hearings, 
supra note 69, at 68.  Similarly, a July 2, 1976, Senate Banking Committee 
Report discussed questionable overseas “payments to foreign sales agents, 
many of whom act essentially as influence peddlers.”  S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 
9 (1976).  Dr. Gordon Adams, Director of Military Research for the Council on 
Economic Priorities, testified before the House Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
in April 1977 that “[a] large proportion of the bribes paid government officials 
did not result from direct company/government contact,” but rather “[m]ost 
firms ha[d] used sales agents, often local nationals, to seek orders and to carry 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
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Although Congress understood the foreign agent problem, 
the FCPA, as enacted in 1977, took only limited steps to stop it.71  
The initial FCPA had accounting provisions that would make it 
more difficult to conceal bribes paid through agents, but the 
bribery offense was limited to “issuers” and individuals and 
corporations who were “domestic concerns.”72  Thus, issuers and 
domestic concerns, including U.S. citizens, who paid bribes to 
foreign officials through the use of foreign agents could be 
prosecuted for bribery, but neither the foreign official who 
received the bribes nor the foreign agent who paid the bribe 
would be liable.73 
The use of the term “agent” in the congressional record 
during the adoption of the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA 
further confirms it indicated a third party used to pay a bribe.  
Initial drafts of the amendments did not address foreign agents 
at all, but this received some pushback from those who identified 
the problem with “agents” being retained to pay bribes.  Senator 
Proxmire, for example, quoted John Keeney of the Criminal 
Division of the Department of Justice during a debate before the 
Senate Banking Committee as stating that “[t]he majority of the 
FCPA cases which have been investigated involved payments 
made to ‘agents’ or ‘consultants’ who then forwarded all or a 
portion of the money they received to foreign officials.”74  And in 
 
out such transactions.”  Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings 
on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of 
the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 30 (1977) 
[hereinafter “Unlawful Payments Hearings”].  Dr. Adams further testified that 
“[a] number of these payments . . . ha[d] been made by sales agents in foreign 
jurisdictions acting as agents of the company, using slush funds created with 
income drawn from a foreign subsidiary.”  Id. at 38 (emphases added). 
71. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 69, at 1003 (“[T]he FCPA was intended 
to be a limited statute . . . [E]ven though Congress was aware of a wide range 
of foreign corporate payments to a variety of recipients for a variety of reasons, 
it intended, and accepted in passing the FCPA, to capture only a narrow 
category of such payments.”). 
72. See, e.g., Forbes, supra note 67, at 122. 
73. See United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting 
that Congress rejected criminal liability for foreign agents due to Executive 
Branch “voicing concerns for due process protections and clarity of rules for 
foreign persons” and a concern with “overreach”). 
74. S. REP. NO. 99-486, at 28 (1986).  Senator Proxmire argued that 
“[o]ften times in criminal prosecutions you only get to the top persons involved 
in a criminal activity by being able to prosecute the ‘go-fors’ who will then agree 
to testify about the higher-ups in return for leniency.  That is exactly how the 
Watergate conspiracy was cracked.  So why is [the proposed amendment] 
15
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discussing whether to raise the mens rea for a domestic concern 
to be liable for paying a bribe through a third party from “reason 
to know” to “knowing,” 75 it was observed that “[f]oreign 
payments scandals of the 1970s demonstrated a clear need for . 
. . barring bribes paid through third parties” because 
“[n]umerous cases involved companies that used agents as 
conduits for illegal payments.”76  Congress further explained 
that “[i]n adopting the FCPA, Congress determined that it would 
not permit companies to do through agents what they could not 
do directly or otherwise to take a ‘head in the sand’ approach and 
attempt to remain free from liability.”77  As a result of these 
concerns, the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA retained criminal 
liability for employees and agents of a domestic concern that 
were “United States citizen[s], national[s], or resident[s],”78 but 
added a provision extending civil liability to foreign employees 
and agents of a domestic concern.79 
As with the original 1977 version, an explicit definition of 
“agent” was not included in the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, 
but the context in which the term was used is clear.  A section of 
the Conference Report on the final 1988 amendments titled 
“Anti-bribery provision—Standard of Liability for Acts of Third 
Parties (Agents),” for example, defined “third party bribery” as 
“the furnishing of money or any other ‘thing of value’ by an agent 
for the purpose of bribing foreign officials.”80  And a section titled 
“Intermediaries” in reports on the Senate Banking Committee’s 
proposed amendments indicated that proposed changes 
regarding payments through third parties were “intended to be 
the exclusive means of enforcement of the Act with respect to 
payments made by an agent of a ‘domestic concern.”‘81  All these 
references and statements show that Congress meant something 
 
removing the government’s ability to prosecute ‘agents’ or ‘go-fors’ despite the 
specific recommendation of the Justice Department not to do so?”  Id. at 29 
(emphases added). 
75. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 919–21 (1988); see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3), 
(h)(3)(A). 
76. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 75 (1987). 
77. Id. 
78. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 104(g)(B) (1988). 
79. See id. § 104(g)(C). 
80. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 919 (1988) (emphasis added). 
81. S. REP. NO. 97-209, at 20 (1981); S. REP. NO. 98-207, at 21 (1983); S. 
REP. NO. 99-486, at 15 (1986). 
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specific when it included the term “agent” in the FCPA, and that 
was a third party retained to serve as a conduit for the payment 
of bribes. 
The term “agent” was used in the same sense in the 1998 
amendments.  These amendments were part of a much larger 
global effort to combat international bribery.  The United States 
had largely been fighting international bribery alone while 
encouraging other countries to adopt anti-corruption legislation 
of their own that would be comparable to the FCPA.  The OECD 
promulgated the OECD Bribery Convention, which was signed 
by the United States and ultimately dozens of countries.82  As 
DOJ and the SEC observed: “In 1998, the FCPA was amended 
to conform to the requirements of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention.”83 
The OECD Convention called on all parties to make it a 
criminal offense “for any person intentionally to offer, promise 
or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, 
[or] for that official.”84  To bring the United States into 
compliance with the OECD Convention, Congress amended the 
statute to “apply criminal penalties to foreign nationals 
employed by or acting as agents of U.S. companies.”85  As the 
 
82. See OECD Convention, supra note 24. 
83. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3. 
84. OECD Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1.1 (emphasis added); 
Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, at art. VII(1) (June 
20, 1976), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-
0144.  The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises reiterates the 
same understanding of “agent” by advising that international companies 
“should not use third parties such as agents and other intermediaries . . . for 
channeling undue pecuniary or other advantages to public officials.”  Similarly, 
the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions 
prepared a report that identified the word “agent” as a type of intermediary 
and explained “agents often receive excessive compensation that in turn is used 
to fund bribery.”  Typologies on the Role of Intermediaries in International 
Business Transactions, OECD 5, 20 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43879503.pdf; IAFCL Br., supra note 18, at 14 
n.20. (noting that the OECD Working Group document uses the word “agent” 
in that sense more than 50 times.). 
85. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3; see also S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 
4–5 (1998) (“Section 3(d) implements the OECD Convention by eliminating the 
current disparity in treatment between U.S. nationals that are employees or 
agents of domestic concerns and foreign nationals that are employees or agents 
of domestic concerns.  Presently, foreign nationals who are employees or agents 
17
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Second Circuit noted in Hoskins I, prior versions of the statute 
addressed “foreign nationals employed by or acting as agents of 
U.S. companies,” or who were “employed by or acting as agents 
of U.S. companies,”86 which demonstrates a long-standing 
congressional view of employees and agents as separate 
categories. 
In rejecting conspiracy and aiding and abetting theories of 
liability that would extend beyond the FCPA, the Second Circuit 
emphasized that Congress was careful not to expand the liability 
of foreign nationals in ways that are not clearly identified.  The 
court noted that Congress repeatedly had shown a concern with 
“overreaching” by expanding liability to “foreign nationals who 
may not be learned in American law” and the “desire to protect 
such persons,” particularly when doing so may damage “foreign 
policy and public perception of the United States.”87  This would 
not create any hole in the American liability scheme, as 
Congress “repeatedly emphasized that out-of-reach foreign 
entities should not create concern because American companies 
would be liable for violating the Act even if they did so indirectly 
through such persons.”88  And it must be remembered that the 
impetus behind the 1998 FCPA Amendments and the OECD 
Convention was to encourage foreign governments to adopt anti-
bribery legislation of their own, so that better-situated foreign 
governments would prosecute their own citizens.89 
This understanding of the term “agent” is apparent just 
from the Hoskins case.  The government begins its appellate 
brief by claiming that Hoskins should be found liable for his 
involvement in the “hiring consultants to funnel bribes to 
Indonesian officials.”90  But what the government here 
 
(as opposed to officers or directors) are subject only to civil sanctions.  
Eliminating this preferential treatment implements the OECD Convention's 
requirement that ‘[e]ach Party shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish that it is a criminal offense under its law for any person to [make 
unlawful payments].’”). 
86. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 91 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998)); see also Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 91 (explaining 
that the 1998 Act imposed only civil liability on foreign employees or agents, 
but now they would be subject to criminal liability). 
87. Id. at 94–95. 
88. Id. at 94. 
89. See Martinez, supra note 18, at 241. 
90. DOJ Br., supra note 2, at xi (Statement of Issue Presented for Review); 
see also id. at 2 (“Hoskins helped API identify and negotiate with consultants 
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strategically chooses to call “consultants” are the very sort of 
“agents” contemplated by the FCPA.91  The government quotes 
API witnesses as equating “consultants” with “agents,”92 and 
even the prosecution’s summation characterized these 
consultants as “agents.”93 
Thus, when Congress amended the FCPA to expand 
criminal liability to “agents,” it did so against this backdrop 
where “agents” were understood to be persons retained to pay 
bribes to foreign government officials.  This definition of “agent” 
 
who would pass the bribes to officials.”); id. at 12 (“Hoskins assisted API in 
hiring consultants to funnel bribes.”); Reply Brief of DOJ at 10, United States 
v. Hoskins, No. 20-842(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2021) (addressing Hoskins’ 
involvement with “bribe-paying consultants”); id. at 18 (quoting record 
evidence addressing Hoskins’ involvement in “negotiations with agents and 
consultants”). 
91. See Hoskins Br., supra note 16, at 7 n.1 (“Third-party sales 
consultants were commonly referred to as “agents,” within Alstom and in 
international business more broadly.  Congress had precisely these “agents” in 
mind—and not employees of a parent company like Mr. Hoskins—when it 
included “officers, directors, employees and agents” of U.S. issuers and U.S. 
domestic concerns within the scope of the FCPA’s criminal prohibition.”).  The 
FCPA’s legislative history also shows that “consultant” and “agent” are used 
interchangeably.  Examples include: Chairman William Proxmire explaining 
at the April 1976 Senate Banking Committee Hearings that “the law should 
require regular disclosure of all consultant fees and sales commissions paid to 
foreign agents.”  Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 2 (emphases added); Mr. 
Meeker discussing a proposal at those same hearings that “all commissions 
and consultant’s and agent’s fees paid by the corporation to secure contracts or 
to promote corporate business” should be reported.  Id. at 70 (emphases added); 
the SEC Report contained a section discussing recipients of questionable 
payments focused on “Commercial Agents and Consultants,” where the SEC 
discussed the issue of whether “agents” were “acting as conduits for improper 
payments,” and went on to report that in many cases of “unusual sales 
commissions . . . a portion of the payment to a foreign agent or consultant 
ultimately was passed to foreign government officials in order to obtain 
favorable treatment of some kind for the company.”  SEC REPORT, supra note 
69, at 39 (emphases added); A Report on Questionable Foreign Payments by 
Corporations, presented at the April 1977 House Finance Subcommittee 
Hearings by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, describing the 
problem of payments made “indirectly through inflated commissions to sales 
agents or consultants.”  Unlawful Payments Hearings, supra note 70, at 64 
(emphasis added). 
92. See Hoskins Br., supra note 16, at 13 (citing the record regarding the 
strategy with respect to the “consultant or agent”). 
93. See IAFCL Br., supra note 18, at 17 & n.28 (citing Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 1328, 1449 (Nov. 5, 2019)) (noting the prosecutor described 
Hoskins as liable based on his “selection of the agents” and explaining that API 
was concerned it had a “serious agent problem” in which “the agent had not 
shown a willingness to spend money” and was not paying lavish bribes). 
19
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is commensurate with the specific problem posed by agents, and 
this is therefore the meaning the Second Circuit should adopt.94 
 
     B.  Congress Was Careful Not to Adopt Sweeping Liability 
 
While Congress sought to aggressively pursue international 
corruption through the FCPA, it has always been mindful that 
unnecessary assertion of U.S. law abroad could undermine the 
sovereignty of foreign governments and disrupt foreign 
relations.  The FCPA more broadly punishes those who supply 
bribes than it did in the past, but it still does nothing to punish 
foreign government officials who receive, and often demand, 
bribes.  Congress has shown similar restraint in expanding the 
scope of liability to other categories of liable persons, including 
agents. 
In 1977, Congress and the Carter Administration set out to 
“pass aggressive anti-bribery legislation” to combat bribery of 
foreign officials by American companies.95  President Carter, 
urged by sponsors of the 1976 precursor to the FCPA, which 
passed the Senate but failed in the House, “suggested that 
‘specific criminal penalties’ for acts of bribery were the correct 
approach to solving the problem.”96  But Congress and the 
Administration understood that “a statute focusing on 
criminalization, rather than disclosure, required a delicate 
touch where extraterritorial conduct and foreign nationals were 
concerned.”97  The Second Circuit quoted Secretary of the 
Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal’s warning that “a law which 
provides criminal penalties must describe the persons and acts 
covered with a high degree of specificity,” and must “insur[e] 
fairness and due process, not only for American citizens but also 
for those foreign citizens and foreign countries who may in some 
way become involved.”98  This concern was so great that while 
the initial drafts of the FCPA contemplated the use of conspiracy 
 
94. See supra note 16 (addressing canon that Congress adopts terms of 
art). 
95. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 86 (2d Cir. 2018). 
96. Id. (citing Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 70 (statement of W. 
Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury)). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (citing Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 94 (statement of W. 
Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury)) (emphasis added). 
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and complicity theories to impose individual liability, “[i]n 
response to administration concerns—particularly concerns 
regarding the clarity of liability and its application to foreign 
persons—the Senate rejected its prior approach . . . [and] opted 
for a version of the bill that was not reliant on conspiracy or 
complicity theories . . . [and instead] defined, with great 
precision, who would be liable.”99 
The initial Administration and Senate bill was therefore 
revised to specifically impose liability on “any officer, director, 
employee or stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such 
domestic concern,”100 and the initial House bill “created liability 
. . . also for ‘agents’ who ‘knowingly and willfully carried out’ 
bribes.”101  Nevertheless, “[s]everal leading authorities, 
including Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel of the SEC, suggested 
. . . these provisions went too far” because “the language of 
subsection (c)(2), applying to any agent, might create some 
jurisdictional problems if the agent is wholly situated overseas 
and has not been in this country.”102  Pitt suggested that if such 
jurisdiction was to be asserted, the language should be amended 
to address this “very serious concern” by “clarify[ing] burdens of 
proof, obligations, and the involvement of agents, to provide a fair 
opportunity for an agent to present his defense.”103  The House 
bill was then amended to require that a foreign agent’s liability 
be predicated on the domestic concern’s liability, and to specify 
that this extraterritorial application only “cover[s] ‘agents’ who 
‘carried out’ bribes.”104 
Just as Congress considered conspiracy liability 
insufficiently specific as to the parties and conduct that would 
expose foreign persons to liability to satisfy fairness and due 
process, it had the same concerns regarding the inclusion of 
 
99. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 88. 
100. Unlawful Payments Hearings, supra note 70.  The Hoskins court 
noted that “[a]t the same time that the Senate made these changes, the House 
was revising its own legislation to cut back on liability placed upon foreign 
agents, again because of specific concerns expressed by executive-branch 
officials regarding overreach.”  Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 94. 
101. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 88 (quoting H.R. 3815, 95th Cong. §§ 2(a), 3(c)(2) 
(as introduced Feb. 22, 1977)) (emphasis added). 
102. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 88 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
103. Id. (emphasis added); see Unlawful Payments Hearings, supra note 
70, at 232 (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel, SEC). 
104. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 88. 
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agents.  Subsequently, Congress did expand liability to foreign 
agents, first civilly in the 1988 amendments and then criminally 
in the 1998 amendments, but it did so with the understanding 
that “agent” would mean those agents who are retained for the 
specific purpose of paying foreign government officials bribes.  
That definition addresses Congress’ due process concerns by 
putting foreign defendants on notice of the conduct that would 
expose them to liability while limiting the United States’ 
intrusion into foreign sovereignty. 
 
     C.  Common Law Agency Principles Are of Limited Relevance 
 
The district court was right to conclude that the nature of 
the relationship between Hoskins and API did not comport with 
the structure of an agency relationship, but we believe the more 
fundamental problem with the government’s case is that he is 
not the type of agent Congress intended to subject to FCPA 
liability.  An agency relationship describes a power dynamic and 
the structure of a relationship, but it tells us nothing about what 
a person has been retained to do.  Congress, however, was 
express in enacting and amending the FCPA, that the type of 
agent it sought to cover was one retained to bribe a foreign 
government official on behalf of a U.S. company or person. 
Even at common law, the term “agent” was an elastic word 
and held a broader or narrower meaning depending on the 
context in which it was used.105  The Third Restatement, which 
the district court relied upon extensively,106 acknowledges that 
agency “encompasses a wide and diverse range of relationships 
and circumstances” and “legal usage varies,” as does usage “in 
commercial settings and academic literature.”107 
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines the term as 
“[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or in place of another,”108 
but distinguishes between two general categories—”general 
 
105. It has long been noted that “many doctrines in the law of agency are 
vague and ill-defined.” Book Note, 15 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1901) (reviewing 
ERNEST HUFFCUT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901)). 
106. See United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12cr238, 2020 WL 914302, at *2–
3 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2020). 
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. (b), (c) (AM. L. INST. 
2006). 
108. Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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agents,” who are “authorized to transact all the principal’s 
business of a particular kind or in a particular place,” and 
“special agents” “employed to conduct a particular transaction or 
to perform a specified act.”109  It then lists a whopping seventy-
four different “types” of general and special agents defined by 
the type of acts or services they provide on behalf of the 
principal.110  Rather than having a fixed and uniform meaning, 
“agent” is the sort of term that the Supreme Court has described 
as a “chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in and 
purpose for which it is used.”111 
In these terms, “agent” as used in the FCPA refers to a type 
of common law “special agent” retained for the purpose of paying 
bribes to foreign government officials.  While the Hoskins 
parties112 (and apparently others)113 seem to consider this 
definition to be narrower than the common law of agency, we 
view it as a reference to a particular kind of common law special 
agent defined by both the structure and purpose of the 
relationship.114  This is how Congress understood the term, and 
 
109. Id. 
110. See id.  As the THIRD RESTATEMENT notes, “[p]eople often retain 
agents to perform specific services.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
cmt. (c) (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
111. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006); see also 
C.I.R. v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.) 
(“[W]ords are chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment.”). 
112. See supra note 17. 
113. See supra note 18. 
114. Because Congress intended to adopt the definition of “agent” as it 
was used as a term of art in the anti-corruption community, whether this 
definition is viewed as narrower than the common law or as a particular 
application of the common law is a semantic difference that should not matter.  
Nevertheless, the government attaches great importance to the common law 
label.  On appeal, the government claims that Hoskins waived any argument 
that “agent” be defined as NACDL or IACFL suggests because Hoskins raised 
this argument in only a footnote and previously conceded that “agent” should 
be defined in accordance with the common law.  Reply Brief of DOJ at 36–40, 
United States v. Hoskins, No. 20-842(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2021).  The 
government’s argument is mistaken.  The principal argument on appeal is over 
the meaning of the term “agent” in the FCPA and the Second Circuit “review[s] 
questions of statutory interpretation de novo.”  Roach v. Morse, 440 F.3d 53, 
56 (2d Cir. 2006).  In doing so, the Second Circuit is not bound to accept the 
statutory interpretation of either party.  The Court can consider the views of 
amici and other sources, including law review articles, in striving to give a 
statute the correct interpretation.  While the parties may believe the definition 
of “agent” lies in the common law, whether the correct interpretation of the 
term lies elsewhere is a subsidiary question that is fairly included in the 
23
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as discussed, it adopted this limited common-law definition to 
provide necessary clarity with respect to the categories of 
persons and conduct it intended to reach. 
 
III.  STATUTORY CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION FAVOR A 
NARROW DEFINITION OF AGENT 
 
     A. The Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA Should Be 
Construed Narrowly 
 
In Hoskins I, the Second Circuit found that Congress 
expressed “an affirmative legislative policy in the FCPA to limit 
criminal liability to the enumerated categories of defendants,” 
but independent of this rationale the court emphasized that it 
would rule for Hoskins because the government had failed to 
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality with clearly 
expressed congressional intent.115  Those same principles apply 
here, as a definition of “agent” that would stretch as far as 
common law allows would drastically expand the scope of the 
statute to reach all types of foreign persons, regardless of what 
they were retained to do. 
 
question presented.  See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 
101 n.7 (2013); Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379–80 
(1995) (“a different but closely related theory” is within the question 
presented).  Furthermore, the government’s contention that the Court should 
not consider arguments raised by an amicus alone are overbroad, and do not 
apply to questions involving the interpretation of legal texts before the Court.  
See, e.g., Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. C.I.R., 930 F.2d 975, 986 & n.9, 988–90 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (considering argument by amicus regarding a phrase in 
Appointments Clause even though parties relied upon different language and 
expressly rejected reliance on language argued by amicus).  Indeed, the very 
purpose of amicus briefs is to raise new issues that are not addressed by the 
parties.  See FED. R. APP. P. 29. advisory committee note to 1988 amendment 
(citing S. CT. R. 37.1) (“An amicus curiae brief which brings relevant matter to 
the attention of the Court that has not already been brought to its attention by 
the parties is of considerable help to the Court.  An amicus curiae brief which 
does not serve this purpose simply burdens the staff and facilities of the Court 
and its filing is not favored.”); see Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 567 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no need 
to allow intervention to raise new legal arguments because “a court is usually 
delighted to hear additional arguments from able amici that will help the court 
toward right answers . . . ”).  In any event, even if the parties’ agreement that 
the definition of “agent” is limited to a common law definition of agent, as 
explained above, the definition we advance meets that common law definition. 
115. See United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 95 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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American courts will “not apply a U.S. law extraterritorially 
unless ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly 
expressed.’”116  This is necessary “to avoid the international 
discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in 
foreign countries” and in recognition of the fact that “Congress 
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”117  Even 
where, as here, Congress plainly meant to reach some 
extraterritorial conduct with the FCPA, the Second Circuit 
explained that “when a statute provides for some extraterritorial 
application, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
operates to limit that provision to its terms.”118  Hoskins I 
concluded that “the FCPA does not impose liability on a foreign 
national who is not an agent, employee, officer, director, or 
shareholder of an American issuer or domestic concern—unless 
that person commits a crime within the territory of the United 
States.”119 
The government, of course, sought to circumvent the 
Hoskins I decision by arguing that Hoskins fell within the 
statutory term “agent,” but as shown above, it is trying to fit a 
square peg in a round hole.  The government is using the wrong 
definition of “agent,” and one that is inconsistent with the 
Hoskins I interpretation of the statute.120  Even assuming the 
government is correct and that “agent” must be construed in 
accordance with the common law of agency, there are a 
multitude of different common law definitions of that term,121 
which would invite ambiguity.  The presumption against 
extraterritoriality would suggest that the term be given a 
narrow construction to prevent it from reaching further than 
Congress intended.122 
 
116. Id. at 85 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991)). 
117. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) 
(quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)); see Foley Bros. 
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
118. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 96 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102). 
119. Id. 
120. See supra Section B(1) 
121. See supra Section B(3). 
122. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
164 (2004) (“[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.”); 
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1991) (applying canon 
to interpret ambiguous statutory language); Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. 
25
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     B. The Nosciur a Sociis and Surplusage Canons Suggest a 
Narrow Meaning of “Agent” 
 
Again, the word “agent” should not be construed in a 
vacuum,123 particularly as it is used in a statute that extends 
liability from entities with a certain U.S. nexus to “any officer, 
director, employee, or agent of such” entities, wherever they may 
be located.124  The noscitur a sociis canon recognizes that “a word 
is known by the company it keeps,”125 and here each of those 
terms references a formal agreement by one person to work for 
another.  Someone would plainly know if he or she had agreed to 
become an officer, director, or employee of a U.S. company, or if 
he or she had agreed to become an agent who would pay bribes 
to a foreign government.  But that parity of understanding is lost 
with the government’s proposed “highly factual” inquiry that 
depends upon a variety of factors to determine who qualifies as 
an agent.126  Having to perform such an unpredictable, multi-
factor analysis with respect to the term “agent” would render it 
unlike the other terms in its series (and undermine the due 
process clarity Congress sought to provide foreign 
defendants).127 
To harmonize the words in the statute, the Second Circuit 
should read them in tandem with the more specific definition of 
“agent” that we suggest.  Courts regularly rely on the noscitur a 
sociis canon in this manner “to avoid ascribing to one word a 
meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
 
United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (limiting extraterritorial 
reach of a statute by construing ambiguous language narrowly, despite the 
government offering a broader plausible interpretation). 
123. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (quoting Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007)). 
124. See, e.g., READING LAW, supra note 15, at 195–98. 
125. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015); see READING LAW, 
supra note 15, at 195–98. 
126. See DOJ Br., supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 
448 F.3d 518. 522 (2d Cir. 2006)) (claiming this inquiry requires considering 
“the situation of the parties, their relations to one another, and the business in 
which they are engaged; the general usages of the business in question and the 
purported principal’s business methods; the nature of the subject matters and 
the circumstances under which the business is done”). 
127. See United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 88 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 
1602 Before the House Fin. Subcomm., 95th Cong. 30 (1977). 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/5
2021 UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS 225 
words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.”128 
Moreover, the noscitur a sociis canon is reinforced by the 
canon against construing statutory terms so broadly as to render 
other statutory language surplusage.129  The Supreme Court has 
long held that Congress “is presumed to have used no 
superfluous words,” and so “where a given construction would 
make a word redundant, [that is] reason for rejecting it.”130  That 
reasoning applies here.  The government’s interpretation of 
“agent,” if stretched as broadly as the principles of common law 
agency would allow, would result in the word “agent” swallowing 
all the other categories of liable persons, rendering “officer,” 
“director,” and “employee” surplusage.  As the Third 
Restatement notes, “[t]he elements of common-law agency are 
present in the relationships between employer and employee, 
corporation and officer, client and lawyer, and partnership and 
general partner.”131  Congress would not therefore have drafted 
the FCPA to include “any officer, director, employee, or agent” if 
it referred to the common law definition of agent that would 
redundantly capture all four.  Instead, Congress plainly 
intended the term “agent” to refer to a distinct type of “special 
agent,” a third-party intermediary engaged by a domestic 
concern to pay a bribe on its behalf. 
 
     C. The Rule of Lenity Warrants a Narrow Construction of the 
 
128. Yates, 574 U.S. at 543 (punctuation and citation omitted); see also 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2369 (2016) (applying the canon 
to the federal bribery statute in giving a narrow definition to the terms used.); 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (recognizing that the 
definition of statutory terms may be “narrowed by the commonsense canon of 
noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise content by 
the neighboring words with which it is associated”). 
129. See, e.g., READING LAW, supra note 15, at 195–98. 
130. Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58–59 (1878); see also 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 (2001) (“Respondent’s contrary 
construction would render the word ‘State’ insignificant, if not wholly 
superfluous, [and courts have a] duty to give effect, where possible, to every 
word of a statute, [and to be] reluctant to treat statutory terms as 
surplusage.”).  To be sure, “[t]he canon against superfluity assists only where 
a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute,” 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011), but this is such a case—
only if “agent” refers to a specific type of special agent do the terms officer, 
director, and employee have distinct meaning and effect. 
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. (c) (AM. L. INST. 2005). 
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Word “Agent” 
 
Because the FCPA is a criminal statute, the “rule of lenity” 
applies and leads to the same narrow reading of the term 
“agent.”  The rule requires that “where there is ambiguity in a 
criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the 
defendant.”132  It derives from the constitutional requirements 
of due process and fair notice, and, like the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, it requires the narrowest interpretation of a 
statute’s liability not expressly rebutted by Congress.133  
Considering the concerns with notice for foreign defendants and 
the perception of American fairness abroad that are implicated 
by the FCPA, a strict application of the rule of lenity is all the 
more crucial to avoid offending the sensibilities of foreign actors 
and sovereigns.134  The Second Circuit should therefore apply 
the rule and find that the more narrow definition of “agent” that 
we propose is controlling. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
“Agent” is a term of art in the international anti-corruption 
community used to refer to those agents who are retained for the 
purpose of acting as intermediaries in funneling bribes to foreign 
government officials, and that is how Congress used the term 
“agent” in the FCPA.  The government is overreaching in seeking 
a definition of “agent” that can be extended to (and beyond) the 
 
132. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
133. See id. at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 
344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952)) (“When choice has to be made between two 
readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before 
we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have 
spoken in language that is clear and definite.”).  For example, one court used 
the rule of lenity, rather than the presumption against extraterritoriality, to 
construe the FCPA and dismiss charges against a foreign national.  See United 
States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  In Bodmer, the 
defendant was charged as an agent of a domestic concern under the FCPA, but 
he argued that because his alleged conduct occurred before the 1998 FCPA 
amendments clarified that foreign agents were subject to criminal and civil 
liability, he could not be criminally liable.  Id.  The court looked to the 
legislative history of the FCPA to determine whether Congress intended to 
subject a foreign agent in his position to criminal liability, and finding it 
ambiguous, relied on the rule of lenity (with no mention of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality) to dismiss the charges.  Id. at 189. 
134. See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
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limits of common law agency and that fails to account for what 
the agent has been retained to do.  Such a definition, and the 
highly factual, multi-factor analysis that the government 
suggests using to define “agent,” would be just as unpredictable 
as the conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories of liability 
that the Hoskins I court wisely limited in the FCPA context. 
Moreover, the same concerns about protecting foreign 
sovereignty that animated Hoskins I remain equally applicable 
now.  The government’s proposed definition of “agent” is so broad 
that it would swallow up all the carefully delineated categories 
of persons expressly limited in the FCPA, rendering them 
surplusage, and drastically expand the scope of U.S. law over 
foreign persons and territory that Congress never intended to 
reach.  Defining the term “agent” in terms of the purpose of the 
agency relationship––paying bribes to foreign government 
officials on behalf of the principal––achieves the objectives of the 
FCPA while avoiding unnecessary intrusion into foreign 
sovereignty.  Not only does that strike the right balance, but also 
the one struck by Congress. 
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